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ABSTRACT 
Most organizations and government agencies regularly become engaged in 
litigation with suppliers, customers, clients, employees, competitors, 
shareholders, prosecutors or regulatory agencies that nearly assures the need to 
organize, retain, find and produce business records and correspondence, e-
mails, accounting records or other data relevant to disputed issues. This article 
discusses some high visibility cases that constrain how metadata and content is 
routinely made available to opposing parties in civil litigation, to prosecutors in 
criminal prosecutions and to agency staff in regulatory enforcement litigation. 
Public policy, as implemented in the rules of evidence and pretrial discovery, 
restrict electronic data discovery (EDD) as it becomes a predominant and 
potentially costly pre-trial activity pivotal to modern litigation. This article 
discusses these constraints while identifying opportunities for the 
interdisciplinary activities among litigators, forensic experts and information 
technology professionals. 
Keywords: electronic data discovery, cyber forensics, pre-trial discovery, 
litigation hold, spoliation, obstruction of justice, electronic records 
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management, metadata 
 
“As a litigator, I will tell you documents are just the bane of our existence. 
Never write when you can speak. Never speak when you can wink.”1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The quote above might be adapted to the emerging arena of electronic data 
discovery (EDD) and cyber forensics as follows: “Never email when you can 
write, never write when you can phone, and never phone when you can meet 
face to face.” While such defensive practices might seem to avert potential 
“smoking gun” disclosures, they also can promote a corporate culture of cover-
up and risky behavior inconsistent with good public and corporate policy. This 
article employs traditional doctrinal legal research to review the emerging field 
of EDD under criminal, civil and regulatory process and provide analysis of the 
implications for cyber forensics and sound electronic records management 
practices. 
Eventually every company, not-for-profit organization, non-governmental 
organization, self-regulatory organization or government agency will end up in 
litigation or involved in a governmental investigation or regulatory action, 
some as a plaintiff to enforce rights or claims, but most as a defendant. Claims 
can be filed by customers, shareholders, former employees, competitors, or by 
watchdog regulatory agencies such as the Security and Exchange Commission, 
Federal Trade Commission, Internal Revenue Service or the U.S. Justice 
Department. In the event of litigation or governmental investigations, it is a 
virtual certainty that records will be subpoenaed, including business records, 
correspondence, and phone logs and emails related to the disputed issue. 
Many people who use email for its speed and efficiency, as compared with 
phone calls or face-to-face meetings, run a significant risk - phone calls and 
personal conservations are evanescent unless wiretapped or recorded. By 
contrast, email is persistent since it is recorded and preserved by the sender, the 
recipient and various network servers and ISPs during transmission. Recent 
high visibility cases in which emails and electronic evidence played a critical 
role, now clearly signal that nearly any electronic record is subject to 
compulsory “discovery,” the mandatory pre-trial process of obtaining 
information from before trial through demands on opposing and third parties. 
The discovery of electronic information includes the recovery of both content 
and meta data of such records during the pre-trial discovery phase of criminal 
and civil litigation as well as in investigations by regulatory agencies. Anyone 
                                                 
1 Statement of panelist Jordan Eth, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Good, The Bad, The Ugly, Nov.10, 
2005, panel hosted by the National Law Journal and Stanford Law School’s Center on Ethics, 
reprinted in National Law Journal, 12 December 2005. 
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with a legally-enforceable interest involved in the litigation, has the right to 
demand traditional paper records, as well as electronic communications, to use 
to prove or to contest facts at issue in legal proceedings. The term, electronic 
data discovery (EDD) is generally becoming applied to a wide range of 
electronic document acquisition from opposing parties, potentially adverse 
parties or third parties, in preparation for civil, criminal and regulatory 
proceedings. 
Many people still remember the famous enforcement action against Merrill 
Lynch when it’s star security analyst Henry Blodget referred in internal emails 
to a “dot.com” company that Merrill had underwritten and which he had 
recommended to Merrill Lynch’s investor clients as “a piece of junk” and “a 
powder keg.” These email disclosures revealed blatant conflicts of interest 
between Merrill Lynch’s underwriting activities and its investment advisory 
divisions. Public disclosure of these conflicts of interest by New York Attorney 
General Elliot Spitzer caused significant damage to Merrill Lynch’s reputation 
and was a pivotal factor in the $100 million civil fine in the settlement with 
New York State and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.2 
Litigants on both sides can be required to help identify and to disclose emails 
and archived internal and external communications (including email files, chat 
files, network server logs, and network back-up tapes) which may be relevant 
to disputed issues involved in litigation or investigations once such records are 
requested by an opposing party. Many persons may still incorrectly believe that 
such internal electronic communications and records are “private” or can be 
relatively easily destroyed. The reality is that EDD often has the ability to 
provide a roadmap of “who knew what and when,” which is so pivotal in 
litigation. The costs of electronic records management (ERM) and of 
responding to mandatory EDD discovery requests are very significant, 
including the search of email and document files residing on employees’ 
desktop and laptop hard drives and restoring network backup tapes, and even 
“recovering” deleted files from hard drives of persons potentially relevant to 
the litigation or investigation. Such costs of responding to EDD discovery 
requests can easily exceed a quarter of a million dollars in business litigation. 
The threat of discovery costs, even before EDD became a predominant focus in 
litigation, could sometimes be used as a “club” to force opposing parties into 
pre-trial settlements in order to avoid much higher discovery costs. Judicial 
penalties for an insufficient response to a discovery request or for concealment 
or destruction of requested or potentially relevant records can be severe, 
including legal sanctions for spoliation in civil and regulatory investigations 
and obstruction of justice charges in criminal cases. Another famous 2002 case 
is illustrative, when Martha Stewart was prosecuted for obstruction of justice 
for trying to cover-up behavior that could indicate that her sudden sale of 3,928 
                                                 
2 SEC v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 03 CV 2941 (S.D.N.Y. April 28, 2003). 
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shares of ImClone stock was based on inside information.3 Her criminal 
conviction for obstruction of justice in 2004 largely rested on electronic 
evidence indicating tampering with potential evidence. 
2. DEFINING ELECTRONIC DATA DISCOVERY 
After litigation has commenced with the filing of a complaint and well before 
the trial takes place, there is a (usually lengthy) period of trial preparation 
during which facts are gathered and information is requested from all parties, 
and parties must make requested but unprivileged information available to the 
opposition. The rules of pretrial discovery require production of requested 
information, so long as the information is potentially relevant to the issues in 
dispute, even if this disclosure would weaken or compromise the producing 
party’s interests. All litigants, both plaintiffs and defendants, may demand 
production of documents and “data compilations” relevant to the prosecution, 
complaint or defense of an issue from almost any party in possession, custody 
or control of that information. This document production duty is required in 
U.S. federal courts in civil cases under the Federal Civil Rules of Procedure 
(Fed.R.Civ.P.)4 and in criminal cases under the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure (Fed.R.Crim.P.) as well as under similar civil and criminal discovery 
rules in all the U.S. states. Fed.R.Civ.P.Rule 34(a) broadly defines the potential 
sources of discoverable data as “writings, drawings, graphs, charts, 
photographs, phonorecords,5 and other data compilations from which 
information can be obtained, translated, if necessary, by the respondent through 
detection devices into reasonably usable form.” Therefore, data compilations 
exposed to discovery include reports, correspondence, memos, text files, 
spreadsheets, PowerPoint presentations, digital photos, graphics and art, email 
including all attachments, instant messages and any other data created on or 
stored on a computer, computer network or any other electronic storage media. 
Often one party in litigation (or an investigation) may not be in possession of 
sufficient facts or evidence to prove the other party’s fault. Under U.S. pretrial 
discovery rules, parties may not hide, destroy nor deny an opposing party 
access to most forms of potentially-incriminating evidence by claiming 
proprietary control. The formulation of “justice” in the U.S. gives all litigants 
the right to request and examine records, files, or other evidence from the 
opposing party if the latter holds exclusive control over such information. With 
great frequency, pre-trial discovery often unearths evidence critical to the 
requester’s success. Consider the high visibility $253 million jury verdict in 
                                                 
3 U.S. v. Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d 368 (S.D.N.Y 2004). 
4 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) (1). 
5 Under U.S. copyright law the term “phonorecord” is broadly defined to include analog vinyl 
and streaming tape recordings as well as digital recordings “fixed” in magnetic and optical 
media. 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 1(1) 
9 
2005 against Merck, maker of the prescription painkiller Vioxx - a Cox-2 
inhibitor.6 Merck defended this claim that Vioxx had caused the plaintiff to 
suffer a fatal heart attack by arguing that arrhythmia or irregular heartbeat had 
caused the death and not a blood clot produced by Vioxx as the plaintiff 
alleged. However, the jury was likely greatly influenced by a 1997 internal 
email authored by Merck’s own research scientist Alise Reicin, that was 
disclosed in response to a discovery request from the plaintiff. In the email, 
sent two years before the FDA approved Vioxx for sale to the public, the 
Merck research scientist worried that “the possibility of increased CV (cardio 
vascular) events is of great concern.” Vioxx was subsequently withdrawn from 
the market by Merck in September, 2004. 
Until the 1990’s, discovery requests for the production of documents mostly 
involved paper records. Much of the content of personal communications 
including phone calls and face-to-face conversations and meetings was 
effectively unavailable unless there were contemporaneous written notes, tape 
recordings or the conversation was recalled in a witness’ testimony under oath 
or in a deposition. The probative value of witness recall depends on witness’ 
credibility as tested by cross-examination and on the strength of rebutting 
evidence. Today, however, most business records are in electronic form and a 
massive amount of both external and internal communication within and 
between organizations is transmitted through networks in digital form. Because 
of this, EDD has become perhaps the most important source of evidence in 
criminal and civil litigation as well as in government and regulatory 
investigations. 
According to one study published in 2003 on the proliferation of electronic 
data, over 90% of business documents are created and stored electronically.7 
While the rapid increase in the overall percentage of business records and 
communications in electronic form is slowing, the absolute percentage of such 
records in electronic form will only continue to grow. Most intra-corporate and 
intra-governmental communication is conducted via email with a growing use 
of even newer electronic communications technologies including instant 
messaging and blogs. Each email contains an electronic record that includes 
not only the content of the email and any file attachments, but also the 
metadata embedded in the message which reveals the sender, the recipients, 
and the sequence and timing of linked messages and attachments. Such 
metadata helps to provide additional “who, what, when” detail to the content of 
communications. Electronic telephone logs and electronic voice mail 
repositories are also discoverable and will likely increase in importance as 
usage of voice-over Internet protocol (VoIP) proliferates.  
                                                 
6 Ernst, et. al. v. Merck & Co. Inc., No. 19961- BH02, (D.C. Tex. Brazoria Co. 2005). 
7 Lyman, Peter and Hal R. Varian, How Much Information, 2003. Retrieved from 
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/how-much-info-2003 on [12.20.05]. 
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In addition to email, other persistent electronic records may be useful in 
proving facts, impeaching witnesses or casting doubt on an opponent’s 
depiction. These electronic records can include documents created, altered or 
stored on computers, logs of network user access, records of web site visits, 
records of web site content downloaded, identity and dates of voice mail 
callers, employee security access code usage (access cards to physical 
locations, floors and offices, and parking facility access), some of which may 
be further corroborated by video surveillance tapes. E-Zaps and many other 
automated toll collection authorities frequently must respond to subpoenas for 
toll use records identifying customers and registered vehicle, time, date and 
location for various evidentiary purposes in legal and regulatory matters. Such 
advances over the past decade in both the amount and variety of information 
created and retained in electronic form has transformed litigation in the U.S. 
Innovations in technology continue to expand the types of electronic data 
discoverable. Consider how voicemail is shifting from individual desktop 
recorders to networked digital storage of voicemail messages. Unless 
effectively purged, voicemail may become as permanent and accessible as is 
email today resulting in much more voicemail discovery. This architecture 
holds the promise for unpleasant surprises because currently voicemails are 
most often preserved only by the recipient, not the sender. Indeed, it is unlikely 
senders can produce voicemails if sought in discovery making employers of 
most senders ignorant of the precise voicemail content and ignorant of the 
general content of renegade employees. It is costly to identify all potential 
voicemail recipients and request recipient recordings. Voicemail search 
technologies are still developing and as yet are neither as sophisticated nor 
effective as are search methods for screening email records for keywords in 
key fields such as sender, recipient(s), time, date, routing, attachments and 
subject matter. 
3. ELECTRONIC RECORDS SUBJECT TO DISCOVERY 
Targets of electronic data discovery requests or subpoenas can include anyone 
possessing information potentially relevant to issues, subject matter and 
participants in an investigation or litigation. Many potentially-discoverable 
email messages are archived on network server backup tapes, by third party 
service providers, at ISPs (e.g., Hotmail, Yahoo, AOL), on personal digital 
assistants (PDA) and Blackberry devices, on cell phones, on personal laptop 
and home computers and in various personal storage media (e.g., floppies, 
portable hard drives, thumb/jump/USB flash drives). External archives and 
caches of Internet content can be used to retrieve the past content of web sites 
and web pages previously posted but later “taken down” and such Internet web 
archives are often admissible evidence in the proof of infringement, internet 
domain name misuse, defamation, trade libel, harassment, misrepresentation, 
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and fraud.8 Litigators now often refer to doing a "Wayback”, a search of 
proprietary archives of website materials for a potential adversary’s prior 
Internet postings, to assist litigation strategies. 
It is important to note that both federal and state discovery rules permit 
requests for preservation of potentially relevant records to be served on persons 
in control of such records even if a lawsuit has not yet been filed or such 
persons are not yet parties to a legal action or governmental investigation. 
Compliance with discovery requests is mandatory for opposing parties and 
their employees and agents. With some very limited exceptions for 
“privileged” communications, such as the attorney-client communications 
concerning pending litigation and investigations and the attorney work product 
privilege, almost all information is discoverable from almost any opposing 
party or third party source. Depending on the situation, there are other 
important, but typically narrowly construed privileges, such as the spousal 
privilege, the doctor-patient privilege, the priest-penitent privilege, and in 
much more limited situations the accountant-client privilege and the self-
evaluation privilege. Even when unprivileged information is obtained in 
discovery, its use and public disclosure may be limited by various types of 
confidentiality, such as court records held under seal by a judge’s order for 
trade secrets or national security matters. Increasingly, confidentiality 
requirements or secrecy orders may suppress disclosure of divorce records and 
information about juveniles and minors. Unless specific public policy 
exceptions like the very limited privileges discussed above are applicable, there 
is no general right to privacy in the U.S. that prevents discovery of potentially 
incriminating information or other evidence damaging to a party’s interest.9  
Metadata is another important aspect of electronic records that many business 
executives and government leaders are still unaware of. Metadata is literally 
“data about data” that accompanies data files and electronic communications. 
A “metadata tag” will indicate various aspects of every file created on a 
computer, including the file creation date, the identity of the computer on 
which it was created, the IP address from which it was accessed, dates of 
editing or simply last viewed/opened and by whom, and all subsequent 
alterations and deletions. Email metadata may also show the sender’s address 
book information, dispatch and receipt date of messages, information about 
forwarding or replies, and the existence or content of attachments. Metadata 
can be useful in showing the sequence and authorship of critical 
                                                 
8 The Internet Archive claims that its Wayback Machine contains “approximately 1 petabyte of 
data and is currently growing at a rate of 20 terabytes per month.” See http://www.archive.org/. 
9 In the high visibility antitrust case against Microsoft, an email by Bill Gates sent from his home 
computer, on a Sunday evening, to someone outside Microsoft, concerning the competitive 
objective of bundling Internet Explorer with Windows was held not to be protected by Mr. 
Gates’ personal right to privacy and was admitted as proof relevant to Mr. Gates’ state of mind. 
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communications. For example, in the 2004 criminal trial of Martha Stewart for 
obstruction of justice in the Imclone affair, the U.S. Department of Justice used 
metadata from an electronic log of office phone calls that indicated that a log of 
one phone call had been erased and later restored on a different computer. The 
Department of Justice used this evidence of tampering with the evidence, when 
correlated with an electronic diary entry showing a meeting with her Merrill 
Lynch broker, to argue that the defendants had met to develop a “cover story” 
to explain the sudden sale of her Imclone stock, and later attempted to cover-up 
the meeting. Despite evidence that Ms. Stewart had second thoughts almost 
immediately and allegedly reentered the erased phone log entry on her own 
office computer, this metadata record supported the government’s contention 
that she had attempted to tamper with evidence of the alleged meeting and 
cover-up. Additional forms of metadata are evolving as the architecture of 
communications methods evolves. The capture and association of user IP 
addresses with particular web site visits by ISP web servers and the potential 
for court orders to require disclosure of identity of web users will likely 
significantly limit the anonymity of web communications and transactions. 
Such IP user access records are used by law enforcement agencies to identify 
purveyors and users of child pornography on the web or to identify both those 
serving and those downloading content using peer-to-peer networks. 
3.1 “Litigation Hold” Compliance 
All persons, businesses, institutions and government agencies have a legal duty 
to preserve records relevant to “reasonably expected” investigations and 
litigation. Thus, when litigation or a governmental investigation becomes 
“reasonably expected” the target of such litigation or investigation must 
immediately issue a “litigation hold”10 throughout the organization that 
preserves all potentially-relevant evidence. Delays of only a few days in 
implementing a litigation hold might result in the automatic overwriting and 
permanent loss of network backup tapes containing emails potentially relevant 
to the pending litigation or investigation, which in turn can lead to charges of 
spoliation. Because of this, all organizations need to have electronic records 
management (ERM) programs in place that specify document retention and 
destruction policies depending on various factors such as time, date, subject 
matter of file, internal needs, etc., and which may be suspended in the even of a 
litigation hold. Consider the landmark (and extremely lengthy) EDD case of 
Zubulake v. UBS-Warburg11 in which UBS was ultimately ordered to pay $29.3 
                                                 
10 A provisional definition of litigation hold is that it is a legal duty to suspend routine document 
destruction when a lawsuit is filed or is reasonably anticipated. This definition is amplified in the 
ensuing text. 
11 Eight related Zubulake decisions were issued between 2003 and 2005: Zubulake v. UBS 
Warburg, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake I: allocating discovery costs for email 
production from backup tapes); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, No. 02 Civ. 1243, 2003 WL 
21087136 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2003) (Zubulake II: Zubulake’s reporting obligations); Zubulake v. 
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million for gender discrimination and sexual harassment claims filed by a 
former female stock broker. The female stock broker plaintiff made discovery 
requests for all UBS internal emails sent by her alleged harasser that were 
expected to support the claim of harassment. 
The judge in Zubulake described the litigation hold process for electronic 
evidence and email as follows: 
Once a party reasonably anticipates litigation, it must suspend its routine 
document retention/destruction policy and put in place a “litigation hold” 
to ensure the preservation of relevant documents. As a general rule, that 
litigation hold does not apply to inaccessible backup tapes (e.g., those 
typically maintained solely for the purpose of disaster recovery), which 
may continue to be recycled on the schedule set forth in the company's 
policy. On the other hand, if backup tapes are accessible (i.e., actively used 
for information retrieval), then such tapes would likely be subject to the 
litigation hold. 
However, it does make sense to create one exception to this general rule. If 
a company can identify where particular employee documents are stored on 
backup tapes, then the tapes storing the documents of “key players” to the 
existing or threatened litigation should be preserved if the information 
contained on those tapes is not otherwise available. This exception applies 
to all backup tapes.12 
When about to initiate litigation, an opposing party’s counsel may send a 
“preservation demand” to parties to the lawsuit demanding that they preserve 
email files and other evidence potentially relevant to a threatened lawsuit, 
which in turn will trigger a responsibility on the part of the targets of such 
preservations demands not to destroy backup tapes where such email records 
are likely to be located. Once a lawsuit is filed and pre-trial discovery begins, 
interrogatories are a useful tool that can be used to identify the existence and 
location of potentially useful electronic records and witnesses. These are 
written questions requiring the opposing party’s answers under oath. 
Once a litigation hold arises, there are numerous and significant legal 
                                                                                                                      
UBS Warburg, 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake III: allocating costs between parties 
for restoration of email backup tapes), Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (Zubulake IV: duty to preserve emails; defendant bears plaintiff's re-deposition costs) 
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 2004 WL 1620866 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2004) (Zubulake V: sanctions 
granted; UBS ordered to pay costs; defense counsel ordered to monitor compliance and preserve 
with a litigation hold); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 231 F.R.D. 159 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.2, 2005) 
(Zubulake Va); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 382 F.Supp.2d 536 (S.D.N.Y. March 20, 2005) 
(Zubulake VI: preventing admission of various evidence); and Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 02-
CV-1243 (April 6, 2005) (Zubulake jury verdict: $29.3 million in damages - $9.1 million 
compensatory, nearly $20.2 million punitive). 
12 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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consequences. Legal counsel must immediately notify the information 
technology personnel to immediately discontinue destruction of records and 
backup tapes containing potentially relevant files. It is advisable to request the 
IT department to explicitly acknowledge the implementation of a litigation 
hold in order to avoid misunderstandings or slip-ups. Document destruction 
must cease immediately and preservation efforts must be undertaken for 
relevant emails, electronic documents and records, and backups. A written 
preservation plan with linked procedures should be developed that designates 
specific electronic evidence and emails for preservation and then the plan 
should be distributed to all employees potentially in control or possession of 
relevant evidence. Outside or independent directors of corporations should also 
be instructed to preserve relevant documents and records.13 Litigation hold 
notices should provide reasons for identifying and preserving specific records, 
such as potential future litigation or regulatory enforcement actions, filed 
lawsuits or complaints, preservation letter, or a court order requiring the 
preservations of records. The notice should also warn of serious sanctions for 
failure to comply. 
Large organizations that are regularly engaged in litigation need to have EDD 
teams already organized to quickly and effectively implement a litigation hold 
including experienced members from IT, legal, human resources and other in-
house and third party records management professionals. Litigation hold 
compliance must be actively monitored to guard against inadvertent destruction 
of relevant records or the appearance that such records have been tampered 
with. All files containing potentially relevant evidence should be preserved in 
an electronic mirror image “snap shot” as soon as the litigation hold attaches, 
in order to authenticate the pre-discovery state of such records and to establish 
the “chain of custody” before any internal review of these records for 
potentially relevant files is undertaken. An internal review of files from 
desktop, laptop and handheld computers of the key employees potentially 
involved in litigation is usually necessary determine whose emails, files or 
Internet activity may contain potentially relevant emails or documents, but this 
should be done only after an archival “snapshot” of such files is made in 
unopened form, since opening or forwarding such files for in-house review will 
alter metadata in the files which may give the appearance that such files were 
subsequently tampered with. Electronic forensics experts, often third party 
service providers are frequently needed to recover or preserve evidence, 
particularly where relevant evidence may exist on backup tapes or erased or 
deleted files on employee computers. Such experts employ procedures and 
software that can authenticate the chain of custody and thereby refute charges 
of alteration or destruction post-litigation hold date. Backup media must be 
preserved to avoid charges of post-litigation hold date tampering. 
                                                 
13 See In re Triton Energy, Ltd. Securities Litigation, 2002 WL 32114464 (E.D. Tex. 
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4. ALLOCATING COSTS OF ELECTRONIC DATA DISCOVERY 
Some critics of U.S. litigation practices have argued that pre-trial discovery is 
so costly that it can be intentionally deployed to coerce defendants into 
arguably unjust, but perhaps cheaper, settlements. Indeed, several proposed 
reforms of product liability, tort liability and securities litigation involve a 
litigation “stay” that serves to halt litigation in order to enable defendants to 
challenge unsubstantiated litigation claims before significant discovery costs 
have to be incurred.14 Judges have long had the power to consider the 
oppressive costs of discovery. The basic discovery rule in federal civil 
litigation, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)15 grants targets of discovery 
requests the right to seek protective orders limiting the scope of discovery if the 
request is overly broad, seeks privileged information or would result in 
“annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” 
In the past, when paper records were predominant, discovery targets were 
typically required to bear the costs of locating, screening for relevance, 
assembling and copying requested records. Today, the much larger volume of 
potentially-relevant electronic records, exacerbated by very significant cost to 
“convert” (decompress and reformat) network backup tapes into reviewable 
form, has prompted some trial judges to shift some of these electronic record 
discovery costs to the requesting party. The Zubulake decisions differentiated 
five categories of increasing recovery difficulty and expense that are currently 
relevant to determining EDD cost sharing:  
1) Active online data on hard drives or active network servers; 
2) Near-line data on removable media (e.g., CD-ROMs, floppy disks, 
magnetic tapes); 
3) Off-line storage or archived data of organized files on off-line 
removable media; 
4) Backup tapes organized not for convenient retrieval but for disaster 
recovery, produced in time sequence (network throughput backups 
made daily, weekly, monthly) and therefore intended primarily for 
massive re-image restoration: 
5) Deleted, fragmented data files recoverable only by forensic experts. 
Active data files, generally found in categories one through three above are 
accessible with the least costly restoration so discovery targets would usually 
be expected to bear the costs of production. Archived, compressed and hidden 
data recovery is more expensive and in some cases may require the specialized 
                                                 
14 See e.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), Pub.L.No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(1995). 
15 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
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services of outside forensic experts to decompress, reformat, organize and 
search such files. In such cases, judges are becoming more sympathetic to cost 
sharing between the requester and the discovery target. Sometimes a court may 
agree that requested network backup tapes be sampled first, in order to predict 
the effort and costs of the data recovery project before making decisions as to 
requested cost sharing. Such cost balancing is authorized by Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 26(b)16 permits judges to weigh the potential relevance of 
requested documents against the burden on the target. The likely benefit of 
discovery is evaluated against the litigation stakes, the parties’ resources and 
the likely relevance of the proposed discovery to resolving the issues. 
The Zubulake case provides an example of a court attempting to allocate 
electronic discovery costs between the parties. SEC rules require broker/dealers 
like UBS Warburg to preserve all external emails sent to customers for three 
years, which UBS stored on optical disks making them relatively easy to 
search. UBS was ordered to assume 100% of those search and production 
costs. By contrast, proof of a gender discrimination claim would likely require 
production of internal emails, and these were preserved by UBS only on 
network backup tapes that existed in various files formats. UBS argued that 
Plaintiff Zubulake should pay part of the cost of searching these backup tapes 
because there were potentially 94 different network backup tapes needed to 
comply with the discovery request. Instead, the Zubulake court ordered that 5 
of the 94 backup tapes selected by Ms. Zubulake as most likely to contain 
relevant emails be sampled to see how likely the remaining backup tapes were 
to contain relevant information. UBS’s outside forensic expert billed nearly 
$12,000 for producing 600 potentially relevant emails from these five backup 
tapes, and the judge determined that 68 of the 600 recovered emails had 
potential relevance. Generalizing from the sample, the judge ordered UBS to 
pay 75% of the total $165,000 estimate for internal email restoration and 100% 
of the attorney’s fees for reviewing and transmitting the relevant documents, 
estimated at over $100,000.17 The scale of EDD restoration and recovery costs 
illustrated in Zubulake are not atypical. Indeed, the $300,000 restoration and 
search costs for emails in Zubulake is not unusual for a larger organization, 
raising legitimate concerns that the cost of threatened discovery can be used 
unfairly to force settlements. Some cases are limiting backup restoration for 
this reason. Consider the “fishing expedition” concerns of Federal Magistrate 
John Facciola when he declined to order the Department of Justice to do a full 
search of potential backup tapes in the case of McPeek v. Ashcroft, a retaliatory 
discharge claim by a former DOJ whistleblower. 
If the likelihood of finding something was the only criterion (for ordering a 
full search of backup tapes), there is a risk someone will have to spend 
                                                 
16 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(iii). 
17 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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hundreds of thousands of dollars to produce a single email. That is an 
awfully expensive needle to justify searching a haystack. . . . . ordering the 
producing party to restore backup tapes upon a (automatic assumption) 
likelihood that they will contain relevant information in every case gives 
the plaintiff a gigantic club with which to beat his opponent into 
settlement. No corporate president in her right mind would fail to settle a 
lawsuit for $100,000 if the restoration of backup tapes would cost 
$300,000.18 
The privately developed Sedona Principles advocate more equitable cost 
sharing and hold some promise to influence judges’ allocation of these 
burdens.19 
5. AVOIDING CONSEQUENCES OF EVIDENCE DESTRUCTION 
Parties always have a disincentive to produce documents that are incriminating 
or which disclose proprietary information or strategy. However, litigation 
process rules have long penalized the intentional destruction of evidence. 
Spoliation is the improper destruction of documents, including email, of 
potential relevance to a pending or forthcoming legal proceeding. The potential 
sanctions for spoliation vary depending on the spoliator’s degree of fault and 
either punish the spoliator and/or give justice to the requesting party. This 
degree of fault varies with the spoliator’s “culpable state of mind” - that there 
was a knowing destruction of evidence relevant to the opposing party’s claim 
or defense. In spoliation cases the courts balance the degree of fault against the 
degree of prejudice caused to the requesting party. Sanctions may include: 
(1) Discovery sanctions (monetary fines); 
(2) Attorneys fees and costs payments to the requesting party for 
spoliation hearings; 
(3) Additional discovery with the costs charged to the culpable party; 
(4) Adverse inference instructions to the jury – permits the jury to infer 
that the spoliation destroyed evidence favorable to the opposition’s 
case and harmful to the spoliator’s case; 
(5) Default judgment on a defendant (imposing liability) or dismissal of a 
plaintiff’s case (an extreme remedy); 
(6) Tort (civil) liability for injuries due to the spoliation. 
5.1 Role of Document Retention and Destruction Programs 
Electronic records management programs often include document management 
                                                 
18 McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (2001). 
19 The Sedona Principles, The Sedona Conference, (Sept. 2005) 
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/dltForm?did=TSG9_05.pdf. 
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and document retention protocols to periodically eliminate unneeded 
documents and records. There are justifications beyond the obvious self-
serving effort to eliminate potential “smoking guns.” For example, the costs of 
storage, management and discovery response are well-known. When 
information is no longer useful or necessary for business purposes and no 
federal or state law requires its retention, there is strong incentive to accept the 
business reasons for destruction. Courts accept the balancing of 
retention/management costs against the possible future use of such records in 
litigation, if the document elimination policies are applied consistently and 
without a sole purpose to thwart opposing parties in litigation. The key 
standard is whether the potential discovery target could reasonably anticipate 
such documents could be relevant to a likely or pending government 
investigation or litigation. 
Furthermore there must be clear proof that the document destruction program 
or its execution is implemented with a specific intent to destroy relevant 
evidence. Consider the recent U.S. Supreme Court reversal of the conviction of 
Arthur Andersen for Enron-related document destruction.20 The 2002 criminal 
conviction of Andersen was overturned because the trial judge’s instructions to 
the jury were flawed, leaving this intent element unclear. An in-house Arthur 
Andersen lawyer’s email reminded staff to faithfully execute “document-
retention” policies on their Enron audit papers and this allegedly triggered a 
extraordinary shredding of Enron audit documents just when, DOJ argued, 
Andersen could “reasonably anticipate” the forthcoming SEC investigation. 
This Arthur Andersen criminal conviction was arguably the direct cause of 
Arthur Andersen’s collapse as clients defected. Thus, a simple reminder of 
document retention program procedures is not, in itself, wrongful without 
further proof of a conscious wrongdoing. Such wrongdoing would require 
contemplation of a particular official proceeding in which the destroyed 
documents might be material. 
5.2 Record Retention Constraints 
Legal requirements for document retention generally depend on three factors: 
(1) the line of business, (2) the type of records in question and (3) the 
significance of archived information to the business model. Government 
regulations from various sources, federal, state, local even international 
regulations, require the creation and maintenance of various business records. 
Some retention requirements apply to most businesses, such as tax records 
under IRS rules, wage and hour records under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
cradle to grave toxic chemical handling under the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA) or employee exposure records under regulations of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). Other requirements 
                                                 
20 Arthur Andersen v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 2129 (2005). 
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are specific to regulated-industries such as for railroads, airlines, public 
utilities, nuclear power plants, federally-chartered or insured banks, securities 
broker/dealers, commodities future commission merchants or registered 
investment advisers. The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) contains over 
2,800 sections requiring record creation and/or maintenance. Retention periods 
range from 30 days up to 50 years. Few federal agencies have email retention 
rules yet, the SEC is at the forefront with rule SEC Exchange Act Rule 17a-4(f) 
requiring broker-dealers to retain all correspondence with customers for three 
years, and this specifically includes emails.21 Retained copies must be in a 
“non-rewriteable and non-erasable” format that the SEC describes as follows: 
Under the rule, the electronic storage media also must verify automatically 
the quality and accuracy of the storage media recording process; serialize 
the original and, if applicable, duplicate units of storage media, and time-
date for the required period of retention the information placed on such 
electronic storage media; and have the capacity to readily download 
indexes and records preserved on the electronic storage media to any 
medium acceptable under paragraph (f) as required by the Commission or 
the self-regulatory organizations of which the member, broker, or dealer is 
a member.22 
Despite the SEC’s detailed email retention requirements, such regimes at other 
federal and state agencies remain generally less detailed and frequently are 
unclear. Most retention laws are adapted to electronic communications rather 
than stated in language that is clearly and unequivocally applicable to 
electronic communications. Indeed, 
Donald S. Skupsky, a leading author in document retention practices argues 
that existing federal records retention requirements may not clearly apply to 
emails.23 
5.3 Perils of Aggressive Document Destruction 
It has been reported that at least some organizations employ aggressive email 
destruction policies – erasure of emails after short time frames of 30 to 60 days. 
The tacit reasoning is that if internal emails can be routinely eliminated, this in 
turn will reduce the probability of the subsequent discovery of damaging 
emails. Some document retention experts argue that most email is private 
informal conversation deserving of the same treatment as face-to-face or phone 
conversations. Thus they would argue we do not need to archive all emails for 
                                                 
21 17 CFR 240.17a-4(f). 
22 Electronic Storage of Broker-Dealer Records, SEC Exchange Act Rel.No. 47806 (May 7, 
2003). 
23 See e.g., Skupsky Donald S., (1996) Discovery and Destruction of Email, Chapter 5 in: THE 
INTERNET AND BUSINESS: A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO THE EMERGING LEGAL ISSUES, 
(Computer Law Association). 
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the same reason that we typically do not memorialize phone calls or personal 
conversations. Such a position might require the identification and separation 
of more official, “permanent” emails from “informal” emails. However, giving 
senders or recipients an option to either archive or to eliminate prior 
communications that may involve personal or corporate malfeasance or 
criminal intent will likely seem unacceptable to many policy makers. 
Institutional policies of aggressive email destruction can also increase the risk 
of spoliation or obstruction penalties. Consider the SEC’s discipline and civil 
fines against Deutsche Bank, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, U.S. Bancorp 
and Salomon Smith Barney in 2002 for their alleged systematic destruction of 
network email backups and departed employees’ hard drives.24 Second, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act,25 the SEC rules issued there under and the attendant 
internal control accounting standards issued by the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board26 can arguably be interpreted to prohibit 
aggressive email destruction, at least for publicly-traded companies. 
Aggressive destruction arguably violates the Sarbanes-Oxley Act duties to 
maintain “adequate internal controls.” Further, employee customs and 
institutional practices regarding email often preserve copies in multiple 
locations, on employee hard drives and in electronic and paper printouts. 
Therefore, aggressive email destruction policies may effectively eliminate only 
the organization’s primary copy of potentially incriminating messages, leaving 
untouched secondary copies preserved by employees, service providers, 
suppliers, customers, online and Internet service providers. All too frequently 
such copies are held in less-friendly hands. A very invasive organizational 
effort would be needed to effectively limit and destroy all internal emails, and 
it must be expected that evasion and circumvention will frequently occur as 
copies are surreptitiously retained by both senders and recipients for individual 
defense and whistle blowing or retention is inspired by retaliatory motives in 
support of opposing parties or perceived victims. 
Electronic record management practices increasingly include deletion of 
electronic file metadata using “wiping” programs that erase automatically-
generated metadata on files, communications and Internet browsing history. 
Consider how commercially available applications such as Metadata Assistant 
by Payne Consulting27 enables removing metadata such as a document’s 
author(s), various dates of file creation, printing or access and edits from files 
to preserve confidential information before such files are released externally. 
                                                 
24 In Re Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc., Goldman, Sachs & Co., Morgan Stanley & Co. 
Incorporated, Salomon Smith Barney Inc., And U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray Inc., SEC Exchange 
Act Re. No. 46937 (Dec. 3, 2002) Admin Proc. File No. 3-10957. 
25 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, H.R.3763, 107 P.L. 204, 116 Stat. 745 (July 30, 2002). 
26 http://www.pcaobus.org/. 
27 http://www.payneconsulting.com/. 
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Such tools are also useful to examine files submitted by opposing parties. 
Metadata wiping is prohibited following a litigation hold. Care must be taken 
because metadata can be falsified or surreptitiously supplied after wiping. 
6. DISCOVERY NEGOTIATIONS 
While courts are sensitive to limiting overly-broad and unjustifiably costly 
discovery requests, legal negotiations are typically undertaken to narrow the 
scope of a discovery request or to force a target to respond to costly pre-trial 
discovery requests. For example, the Zubulake gender discrimination case 
involved extensive motion practice, frequent court appearances and eight 
separate court decisions, most on EDD discovery issues, resulting in very 
significant fees for lawyers and forensic experts, and, ultimately, penalties for 
delay tactics as well as adverse publicity for UBS. Non-responsive production 
is all too frequently met with subsequent demands or court sanctions for failure 
to respond. Hence it is often advisable, at the outset of litigation or regulatory 
investigations, to negotiate mutually-agreed parameters for electronic 
discovery – including the subject matter, time window, electronic formats and 
production timetables. Many seasoned litigators can be willing to negotiate 
discovery limits with experienced and reputable counsel and forthright clients. 
Another area for negotiation can be the search criteria, keywords, search 
strings, concept searching and other screening criteria used to identify and 
search potential electronic files that might be relevant to the litigation. 
7. SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ON EDD 
Despite incremental judicial reforms, there are no clear signs on the legal front 
that aggressive discovery of electronic information will slow anytime soon. 
Indeed, it can be expected that a steady stream of publicity will reveal alleged 
wrongdoing exposed via discovery of email and other electronic evidence. The 
preservation and strengthening of an organizations’ “ethical culture” is a 
fundamental concern in how an organization responds to EDD requests. 
Organizational policies concerning preservation, monitoring and disclosure of 
electronic records can significantly impact both employee morale and the 
organization’s long-term survival and prosperity. Organizations that attempt to 
deliberately limit electronic evidence accessibility and disclosure using 
frequent email and electronic record destruction, risk establishing a perception 
among their employees that this is done to hide unethical practices or 
malfeasance, and therefore, by implication, risk establishing a corporate 
perception that such activities will be shielded from pubic scrutiny or, by 
implication, are acceptable. By contrast, an organization that is able to make 
both internal and external electronic communications accessible for internal 
review as well as electronic discovery requests, where applicable, projects a 
culture of intolerance towards illegal or unethical activity. The ability to 
monitor employee and corporate activities and to take corrective action as 
necessary is an essential element of a strong corporate ethical culture. This 
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approach might be implemented with routine preservation of all emails and 
general backup in readily-accessible, well-organized and well-indexed central 
archives. This in turn, should help to reduce the financial burden to responding 
to EDD discovery requests and of screening potentially relevant files. 
Paper record systems imposed very significant document storage costs as well 
as discovery search and production costs. By contrast, the costs of electronic 
storage continue to drop precipitously. New archiving, recovery and search 
technologies from various third party EDD experts can simplify and reduce 
EDD costs in the event of document requests. The SEC penalties against 
Deutsche Bank, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, and others in 2002 for the 
failure to preserve emails, discussed earlier, as well as the 2005 award of $1.58 
billion by a Florida jury against Morgan Stanley and in favor of Ronald 
Perelman, which was assisted by an “adverse inference” instruction of the trial 
judge to the jury that they could infer that Morgan Stanley’s failure to provide 
requested email records was an indication of guilt, indicates that reliance of 
slipshod retentions of emails only in network backup tapes can add significant 
expense to EDD targets while also increasing risks of spoliation and 
obstruction. 
In summary, electronic data discovery has the unique capability of uncovering 
evidence of internal and external actions and communications of many types 
that were formerly inaccessible, and which can often be determinative in civil, 
criminal, and regulatory litigation and investigations. Legal discovery practice 
is evolving to catch up with rapid technological developments in 
communications and data preservation and as a result, EDD can be expected to 
continue to be a critical driver of modern litigation practice and therefore of the 
burgeoning professional fields of cyber forensics. Landmark cases such as 
Zubulake and emerging requirements of regulatory agencies for the 
preservation of electronic communications in closely regulated business sectors 
such as financial services are setting potential standards for retention and 
management of electronic records that can be expected to spread to other 
industries as well. 
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